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Abstract 
People’s knowledge of the world is limited and frequently imprecise. Thus, epistemic 
challenges are commonplace and much research in psychology has investigated their 
consequences. However, research has not systematically investigated how states of negative 
affect correspond to the desire for understanding and meaning in life. We investigated the 
role of epistemic motivations (e.g. meaning search) as features that distinguish forms of 
negative affect from one another. In three studies, we used multidimensional scaling to model 
the perceived similarity of negative affect states and then examined to what extent people 
differentiate these states based on their association with epistemic motivations. These studies 
revealed that negative states are reliably differentiated through their relation to epistemic 
pursuits. These findings were verified in a fourth study in which we experimentally induced 
epistemic affect. Overall, these results indicate that epistemic, and existential, concerns 
characterize states of negative affect to a substantial degree. 
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Lost in Multidimensional Space: Epistemic Motivations Define and Distinguish Negative 
Affect 
At the core of human experience is a desire to understand the world (Fromm, 1947; 
Heine, Proulx, & Vohs, 2006; Webster & Kruglanski, 1997). Whether one is performing a 
simple everyday task (e.g., planning meals), or pondering a profound existential dilemma 
(e.g., the purpose of life) epistemic motivations (i.e., motivations concerning the construction 
of knowledge) are central. Consistently, experiences that disrupt the ability to draw 
knowledge and meaning from life can trigger negative affect. Indeed, the history of human 
philosophy and literature is filled with tales of epistemic anguish (e.g., Goethe, 1806/1987; 
Camus, 1955; Sartre, 1943/1956) and taxonomies of everyday emotions include epistemic 
states such as confusion (e.g., Keltner & Shiota, 2003). Yet, the empirical study of emotions 
has historically overlooked affections associated with epistemology (Ellsworth, 2003; Keltner 
& Shiota, 2003; Tomkins, 1963) and only a handful of epistemic states, such as curiosity and 
interest (Kashdan & Silvia, 2009), have been thoroughly investigated. In particular, the realm 
of epistemic negative affect remains underexplored. 
Elucidating the link between negative affect and epistemic motivations is a duly 
needed development. Psychology has seen a proliferation of theory based around the topic of 
epistemic motivation (see Jonas et al., 2014). Models of cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 
1957), closure (Kruglanski, 1989), terror management (Greenberg et al., 1990) and meaning-
regulation (Proulx, Heine, & Vohs, 2010; Park, 2010; Van Tilburg & Igou, 2011) all centre 
around people’s desire to understand the world. Largely, these models take a predominantly 
cognitive approach and, in some cases, neglect the role of affective states in epistemic 
processes (see Lambert et al., 2014). Yet, research demonstrates that emotions provide 
epistemic information (Abeyta, Routledge, Juhl, & Robinson, 2015; Van Tilburg, Sedikides, 
Wildschut, & Vingerhoets, in press). Thus, the current research aims to integrate affect and 
EPISTEMIC NEGATIVE AFFECT  4 
 
epistemic motivation in a systematic fashion by examining the degree to which epistemic 
motivations characterize perceived differences between negative affect states. This approach 
will allow researchers to more easily define which negative states of affect are more or less 
“epistemic” and inform practitioners on how negative affect may be modified by addressing 
epistemic concerns. 
Epistemic Affect 
Historically, little attention has been paid to epistemic experiences in the psychology 
of emotion (Ekman, 1992; Lazarus, 1991), which is surprising given that a need to 
understand the world is a core function of cognitive and motivational systems (Berlyne, 1960; 
Silvia, 2010). In contrast, the emotional taxonomies of lay people contain numerous 
epistemic states (e.g., confusion; Keltner & Shiota, 2003; Rozin & Cohen, 2003) and the 
centrality of these affective experiences is, for example, reflected in the work of Darwin 
(1872/1965), who devoted a chapter to what he termed intellectual emotions, and in the work 
of Tomkins (1962), who wrote about the neglect of emotions associated with learning and 
knowledge.  
Negative Epistemic Affect 
Beyond appraisals of pleasure or pain, or restfulness versus stress, people are 
concerned with how much meaning and understanding they can gain from everyday life. 
Indeed, the desire for understanding and meaning has been recognized as a core social 
motivation (Fiske, 2004; Heine, Proulx, & Vohs, 2006; Pekrun, Vogl, Muis, & Sinatra, 
2017). Given that negative affect serves to inform a person of some discrepancy between 
current states and desired goal states (Frijda, 1994; Scherer, 2009; Schwarz & Clore, 1983) it 
should therefore also guide people in their understanding of the world. Accordingly, we 
propose that epistemic motivations should characterize internal representations and 
experiences of negative affect and effectively differentiate how people conceptualize discrete 
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states. In doing so, these motivations should distinguish epistemic states from non-epistemic 
states. 
Affect has general epistemic functions (Frijda, 1988; Schwarz & Clore, 1983): It 
indicates how we feel about our current situation or our state of knowledge. Beyond the pure 
epistemic function of affect, epistemic affect should concern the quality of one’s current state 
of knowledge and the motivation for knowledge acquisition and sense-making. Feelings of 
confusion, doubt, and uncertainty signal that the quality of one’s knowledge or understanding 
is insufficient (Carver & Scherer, 2008) and trigger attempts to repair or reassess some 
information (D’Mello, Lehman, Pekrun, & Graesser, 2014; Hookway, 2003; Van den Bos, 
2001). Overall, epistemic states should serve epistemic functions (Pekrun et al., 2017) and as 
such, people should differentiate more epistemic states from less epistemic states on the bases 
of how much they relate to epistemic motivations. We test this assumption using a 
dimensional approach. 
Dimensional Approaches 
Dimensional models if emotion accommodate a range of affective states and provide a 
basis for understanding how they relate. These models vary in their complexity and 
representative content depending on the states examined. For example, Russell’s (1980) 
circumplex model consists of a two-dimensional structure that represents affective 
experiences in a circular arrangement around the orthogonal dimensions of arousal and 
valence. Fontaine, Scherer, Roesch, and Ellsworth (2007) found that four features could 
account for interrelations among  (arousal, valence, potency-control, & unpredictability) 
while Smith and Ellsworth (1985) refer to six (pleasantness, anticipated effort, certainty, 
attentional activity, self-other responsibility/control, & situational control). Although they 
vary in content, empirical support for each of these models is strong (see Posner, Russell, & 
Peterson, 2005). 
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We likewise use a dimensional model to understand the principles that distinguish 
negative affective states, with the particular goal of identifying if epistemic motivations play 
such a role. Importantly, while the approaches highlighted above examined general features 
that distinguish various affective states (see Ellsworth & Scherer, 2003; Russell, 1980; Widen 
& Russell, 2003) we focus especially on the epistemic features of negative affect. Our 
framework includes core features form earlier models (e.g., Russell, 1980), and crucially adds 
epistemic motivations as discriminatory components for epistemic negative affect.  
Epistemic Motivations as Characteristic of Negative Affect 
Our conceptualization of epistemic affect emphasizes the role of epistemic 
motivations, such as sense-making and understanding (e.g., Fiske, 2004). Sense-making is 
defined as a motivated process of organising connections or fitting information into a frame 
or model (Piaget, 1972; Weick, 1995). It is a cognitive process included in clinical models of 
threat, trauma and challenge (Nolen-Hoeksema, Wisco, & Lyubomirsky, 2008; Park, 2010). 
The motivation to understand has been identified as a core human motivation (Fiske, 2004; 
Fromm, 1947) and, as an epistemic pursuit, it can perhaps be considered as broader than 
sense-making. We choose sense-making and understanding as representative epistemic 
motivations to investigate. We further added meaning search to this list in to test the 
theoretical assumptions of meaning-regulation models. 
A desire to understand the world is a common theme among conceptualisations of 
‘meaning’ (King, 2012; Proulx & Heine, 2006; Van Tilburg & Igou, 2011). Indeed, epistemic 
coherence is a core component of meaningfulness (Martela & Steger, 2016) and in 
accordance with meaning regulation models, experiences that undermine our sense of 
coherence should trigger compensatory meaning-seeking responses (Maher, Van Tilburg, & 
Van den Tol, 2013; Proulx et al., 2010; Van Tilburg & Igou, 2011). If epistemic clarity is 
essential for meaning presence, and therefore a goal of meaning search, then meaning-
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seeking motivation should similarly characterize epistemic states in multidimensional space. 
To test this assumption, we include meaning search as an epistemic motivation, alongside 
sense-making and understanding, and investigate how well these motivations distinguish 
states of negative affect. 
Practical Relevance 
The proposition that epistemic motivations characterize states of negative affect has 
implications for psychological interventions. If epistemic concerns perpetuate states of 
negative affect, then effective interventions should address these concerns. Indeed, meaning 
making and sense making have been identified as important variables in trauma recovery 
(Dollinger, 1986; Park, 2010). For example, the violation of core beliefs represents a strong 
epistemic challenge, and Park et al. (2008) found that positive reframing was not associated 
with long-term well-being among cancer survivors who had experienced a violation of core 
beliefs. Core belief violation instead lead to intrusive rumination. Similarly, the disruption of 
worldviews has been shown to disrupt recovery among those exposed to financial hardship 
(Guteirrez, Park, & Wright, 2017) or mass violence (Smith, Abeyta, Hughes, & Jones, 2015). 
Thus, clinical outcomes can be disrupted by epistemic challenges. Establishing how different 
states of negative affect are associated with epistemic concerns may help practitioners use 
discrete states as a guide to indicate when efforts to facilitate sense-making and 
understanding are most appropriate.  
Current Research 
Epistemic motivations permeate simple everyday concerns and broader existential 
crises, and in doing so, characterize states of negative affect. We use dimensional modelling 
as a tool to systematically investigate if, and how, epistemic motivations differentiate 
negative affect and to test theoretical assumptions of emotion models (Frijda, 1994; Scherer, 
2009) and existential psychology (Proulx & Heine, 2006; Van Tilburg & Igou, 2011). 
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Furthermore, we aim to create a framework that will establish boundaries for this emerging 
category of epistemic emotion (Pekrun et al., 2017). For instance, perhaps confusion, doubt 
and uncertainty are more related to epistemic motivations than, for example, regret and 
disappointment (e.g., Martinez, Zeelenberg, & Rijsman, 2011). To be clear, we did not set out 
to test if epistemic motivation might replace basic emotion dimensions such as valence or 
arousal (e.g., Russell, 1980). Rather, we tested how useful epistemic motivation are in 
capturing differences between negative affective states, while using established non-
epistemic characteristics (e.g., valence, arousal) as helpful benchmarks. This is important 
given the relevance of epistemic motivation across personal, social, and clinical settings 
(Heine et al., 2003; Steger, Oishi, & Kashdan, 2009). 
Studies 1-3: Purpose and Approach 
In Studies 1-3, we followed an approach common to many dimensional models (e.g., 
Fontaine et al., 2007; Russell, 1980) by assessing (A) people’s judgments of the similarity of 
different states and (B) how these states rate on several different evaluative features, both 
general (e.g., valence) and epistemic (e.g., meaning search). 
The similarity ratings of negative affective states at Stage A, allowed us to quantify 
how much states differ from each other using a spatial representation where large (small) 
distances between two states correspond to dissimilarity (similarity). Effectively, these 
dimensional models spatially represent people’s internal cognitive representations of negative 
affect (Roseman & Smith, 2001). Indeed, such approaches have been successfully used to 
uncover people’s representations of self-relevant emotions (Van Tilburg et al., 2017; Van 
Tilburg et al., 2018), facial expressions of emotion (Russell, & Bullock, 1985), and music-
evoked affect (Bigand, Vieillard, Madurell, Marozeau, & Dacquet, 2005). 
We then used these spatial representations to evaluate the role of epistemic 
motivation. In Stage B, people rated the affective states on the extent to which they are 
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characterized by epistemic motivations (e.g., sense-making) and other evaluative features 
(e.g., valence). Next, we statistically fitted these features into the spatial representations 
identified in Stage A. Effectively, this second Stage allowed us to assess (I) how well ratings 
on evaluative features corresponded to the positioning of states in the spatial representation 
(reflected in magnitude of explained variance); and (II) what areas of the spatial 
representation were characterized by high versus low ratings on these feature (represented by 
the position of the feature as a vector in the spatial representation).  
We focused in the present investigation on negative affect in particular and did so for 
a number of reasons. Firstly, our theoretical focus concerns psychological and more 
specifically existential, threats and challenges. An important facet of psychological threat 
relates to epistemic motivations such as the need to know and understand the world. By 
examining the link between negative affect and epistemic motivation we aim to understand 
how people respond to such challenges. Secondly, we propose that epistemic motivations 
relate to epistemic goals that are unmet (e.g. the search for meaning), and that unmet goals 
are associated with negative affect in particular (Scherer, 2009; Schwarz & Clore, 1983). 
Furthermore, the approach of evaluating a subset of affective states using multidimensional 
scaling analysis (MDS) to test the importance of distinguishing features has been taken in the 
past (Gray & Wegner, 2011; Van Tilburg, Wildschut, & Sedikides, 2017).  
Methods: Studies 1-3 
We examined epistemic negative affect in two stages (A and B) common in 
multidimensional scaling (e.g., Rusbult et al., 1993; Van Tilburg & Igou, 2017). The first 
stage examined ‘raw’ similarities and differences between states in a dimensional structure 
using replicated-MDS (RMDS; Jaworska & Chupetlovska-Anastasova, 2009). The second 
stage examined the underlying psychological features that account for these similarities and 
differences. As in other multidimensional scaling studies (e.g., Rusbult et al., 1993), separate 
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samples were used for each stage of examination. (The Supplementary Materials offer 
additional guidance on the Multidimensional Scaling Analysis.) The sample sizes obtained 
were based on prior psychology research using multidimensional scaling (e.g., Van Tilburg, 
Wildschut, & Sedikides, 2015). 
In Stage A participants in the first sample rated the extent to which negative affective 
states were similar to each other. In Stage B a second sample of participants rated each of the 
affective states on a number of different evaluative features. We selected features that broadly 
capture dimensions common across previous models, namely valence, arousal, depth, 
self/other responsibility, control, situational-control and certainty (e.g., Fontaine et al., 2007; 
Smith & Ellsworth, 1985). Crucially, we also examined if epistemic motivations could 
effectively characterize the similarities/differences and for this purpose participants also rated 
the negative affective states on the three epistemic motivations described above.  
We began by testing 10 different affective states in Study 1 and subsequently tested 
an increasing number of affective states in Studies 2 (14 states) and 3 (18 states) to verify the 
generalizability of the model derived. Specifically, Study 1 was designed to test if, and how, 
epistemic negative affective states could be distinguished from one another and from less 
epistemic states. In Studies 2 and 3, we added more affective states to the models in order to 
see if the dimensional solutions would still hold. The specific affective states and evaluative 
features we used in our studies are listed below.  
Procedures 
Study 1. Participants in Stage A (N = 42; 23 women; Mage = 24.41, SD = 6.49) and 
participants for Stage B (N = 42; 21 women; Mage = 22.73, SD = 4.44) were recruited using 
the online research service Prolific Academic and received 1 pound sterling for their 
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participation. In each participant sample (A and B) one participant was removed for careless 
responding.1  
Sample A rated the similarity of 10 affective states. These consisted of five that we 
anticipated to be relatively epistemic (confusion, disillusionment, doubt, surprise, 
uncertainty), complemented by five that we anticipated to be less epistemic (anger, 
disappointment, frustration, regret, sadness). Overall, participants rated 45 different pairs of 
affective states using a scale from 1 (very different) to 10 (very similar). Sample B 
participants also rated the similarity of these 10 affective states. Additionally, they rated each 
of these 10 affective states on 10 different evaluative features (valence, arousal, depth, 
self/other responsibility, control, situational-control, meaning search, understanding, & 
sense-making). Specifically, each state was given a score of 1-10 on each feature; participants 
read a brief description of each characteristic to ensure consistency across interpretations (see 
Supplementary Materials) 
Study 2. Participants at Stage A (N = 82; 44 women; Mage =37.73, SD = 11.10) and 
participants at Stage B (N = 82; 41 women; Mage = 35.27, SD = 11.49) were recruited online 
using MTurk. They received 1 US dollar for participation. Nine participants at Stage A were 
removed for careless responding. We put this increase in the careless responding2 rate down 
to the larger number of emotion comparisons participants were asked to make. 
Alongside the 10 affective states from Study 1 participants assessed 4 additional 
states. Specifically, we added guilt, shame, disgust and fear as these four states are 
additionally present in both Smith and Ellsworth’s (1985) dimensional model and Roseman 
                                                 
1 These participants either did not complete the study, or completed the study at less than half 
the average completion time and choose over 10 consecutive items with the same response 
option. 
2 These participants either did not complete the study, or completed the study at less than half 
the average completion time and choose over 10 consecutive items with the same response 
option. 
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Wiest, and Swartz (1994) experiential content analysis on differentiating negative affect. 
Overall, in Stage A, participants rated 91 different pairs of affective states, using a scale from 
1 (very different) to 10 (very similar). In Stage B, different participants rated each state on the 
6 features retained from Study 13; arousal, certainty, meaning search, understanding, and 
sense-making.  
Study 3. Stage A (N = 150; 72 women; Mage = 32.77, SD = 10.18) and Stage B (N = 
82; 32 women; Mage = 33.56, SD = 11.33) participants were recruited via MTurk. They 
received 1 US dollar for their participation. Four participants at stage A were removed for 
careless responding. 
Stage A participants rated the similarity of 18 different affective states. Four 
additional negative states (anxiety, contempt, distress, loneliness) were added to the 14 states 
from Study 2. Distress and contempt were again sourced from research by both Smith and 
Ellsworth (1985), and Roseman and colleagues (1994). Adding these states also allowed us to 
capture most of the negative states proposed by other taxonomies (e.g., Tomkins, 1963). We 
also included anxiety and loneliness. Anxiety has been labelled an ‘epistemic emotion’ 
(Miceli & Castelfranchi, 2005), and has been considered to play a role in epistemic process 
like cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957) and terror management (Greenberg et al., 1990). 
We also surmised that loneliness could, in part, be considered an epistemic state. 
Belongingness is a key feature of meaningfulness (Proulx & Heine, 2006) and social 
connections (Van Tilburg & Igou, 2016), and social identities are used by people to imbue 
life with meaning (Van Tilburg & Igou, 2011). Loneliness could thus be considered as an 
affective response to the absence social and epistemic resources.  
                                                 
3 Four features were dropped after Study 1 on the basis that they were either not rated reliably 
or could not explain at least 50% of variation in the Study 1 model. 
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Comparing all 18 states would require 153 comparisons for each participant, so to 
avoid response fatigue, we presented each participant with a random selection of 60 different 
comparisons, resulting in a total of 8,760 different comparisons between the 18 affective 
states, on average 486 comparisons per state. Participants used the same 1-10 rating scale 
from Studies 1 and 2. At stage B, participants rated each state on the 6 features retained from 
Study 1—arousal, certainty, meaning search, sense-making, understanding, and valence.  
Results and Discussion: Studies 1-3 
Stage A: Plotting Similarities and Differences with Dimensional Structures 
In each study, the Stage A similarity ratings provided a score for each pair of affective 
states. We organized these scores into similarity matrices, with each cell containing the 
similarity ratings corresponding to one of the emotion pairs that a participant rated. To 
establish a spatial representation of these similarity ratings across participants, we conducted 
replicated-MDS (RMDS; Jaworska & Chupetlovska-Anastasova, 2009). This assesses each 
matrix simultaneously to derive a common spatial representation of similarity ratings across 
participants (see supplementary materials for further details). The first step in this analysis 
identifies the number of dimensions that fit the data most appropriately. To determine this, 
we assessed the stress level of different dimensional fits and observed which model brought 
about the largest reduction in stress. In each study, a two-dimensional structure brought about 
the largest reduction in model stress. A value of Stress < .15 indicates adequate fit (Kruskal 
& Wish, 1972). In all three studies, stress values for the two-dimensional models fell below 
.15 (Stress = .085, Stress = .099, Stress = .120, respectively), indicating that a two-
dimensional representation described the differences/similarities among negative affective 
states effectively. 
 Study 1. We conducted replicated multidimensional scaling analyses (RMDS) for the 
similarity ratings from Stage A participants. We tested all possible models, ranging from 1-9 
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dimensions and found that a two-dimensional structure brought about the largest reduction in 
model stress. Figure 1 displays the position of each state in this dimensional structure. In this 
representation, several epistemic states appear to cluster together toward the upper right 
quadrant of the two-dimensional space suggesting that people intuitively distinguish 
epistemic states from more general negative states such as sadness, frustration, and anger. 
Study 2. After increasing the number of affective states under investigation, we again 
found that a two-dimensional structure brought about the largest reduction in model stress. 
Figure 2 displays the position of each state in this structure. The 10 affective states 
investigated in Study 1 occupied a highly similar location within the Study 2 dimensional 
structure. This was confirmed by the correlations of their dimension 1 and dimension 2 co-
ordinates across the studies (r = .98, p < .001, and, r = .90, p < .001, resp.). These findings 
provide support for the integrity of the models we derived. As in Study 1, the affective states 
we hypothesized as ‘epistemic’ occupy a unique space around the upper right quadrant of the 
model. Note that the newly added state fear also occupied this area of the model. In Study 3, 
we sought to replicate the integrity of the spatial structure among an even larger range of 
affective states, furthering the generalizability of our findings, and testing whether the finding 
regarding fear would also replicate.  
Study 3. Figure 3 illustrates the position of each state on the Study 3 derived spatial 
structure. The original 10 affective states from Study 1 again emerged in highly similar 
positions across dimensions 1 and 2, reflected in high correlations between the coordinates of 
these states in this study and in Study 1 on dimension 1 (r = .96, p < .001) and dimension 2 (r 
= .97, p < .001). Likewise, the 14 states tested in Study 2 also occupy highly similar positions 
in this structure, as indicated by the high correlations between coordinates across these 
studies (r = .91, p < .001 for dimension 1; r = .83, p < .001 for dimension 2). The more 
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epistemic affective states continue to cluster toward the upper right quadrant of the model, 
with fear and now anxiety also occupying this area. 
Overall, across three studies, we found highly similar spatial structures that represent 
the similarities/differences between a range of negative and epistemic states of affect. In each 
study, epistemic states were clustered together in the upper right-hand quadrant of this space. 
Surprise appears to be somewhat of an exception, as it is separate from these states in Studies 
1 and 2, due to a low score on dimension 2 (y-axis). Interestingly, fear was located among 
this cluster of epistemic states in both Studies 2 and 3.  
Stage B: Evaluative Features  
We investigated whether participant’s conceptualisations of negative affect are 
strongly characterized by differences in epistemic motivations; including meaning search.  
In each study, Stage B participants rated each state on several evaluative features. We 
estimated how these features corresponded to the spatial representations following the 
analytic approach by Rusbult et al. (1993). First, scores for each state on each evaluative 
feature were averaged across participants. Reliability coefficients were assessed to determine 
the appropriateness of these aggregations. Features’ average scores were then regressed onto 
the Dimensions 1 and 2 coordinates from the spatial structure derived. The resultant R2 
figures indicate how well these features characterized the two-dimensional model; whether 
the size of the distances between the positions the states occupied in the spatial representation 
corresponded to them having different ratings on evaluative features.  
In addition, regressing an evaluative feature onto the coordinates for each dimension 
gives standardised regression coefficients that represent direction cosines indicating how a 
characteristic fits the two-dimensional model. More specifically, the coefficients define a 
vector extending from the model origin (Rusbult et al., 1993). The length of this vector 
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reflects fit, whereas its angle indicates how the characteristic in question corresponds with the 
two-dimensional space (See supplementary materials for further details).   
Study 1. Participants rated each state on 10 different evaluative features. Reliability 
coefficients revealed that three features (depth, self/other responsibility, & situational 
control) were not rated reliably across participants (all α’s < 0.50), and these were therefore 
excluded from further analyses. The appropriateness of this aggregation was confirmed for 
the remaining seven features (0.68 ≥ α ≥ 0.85). Regression analyses yielded high explained 
variances for six of the seven features, all R2 ≥ 0.68. These were: certainty, sense-making, 
arousal, search for meaning, understanding, and valence. Table 1 displays explained 
variance figures for each of these features. Figure 1 displays the superimposed vectors for the 
top 6 features in terms of explained variance. These six vectors correspond to estimations of 
how the states in the model, positioned orthogonally to the vector direction, are related to the 
feature in question. For example, doubt was characterized as highly related to meaning 
search. Conversely, anger and frustration show little relation to this feature. The length of the 
vector is analogous to its explained variance; the direction of the vector distinguishes areas in 
the spatial representation characterized by increasingly higher levels of that evaluative feature 
and moving against the direction of the vector distinguishes areas in the spatial representation 
characterized by increasingly low levels of that feature. For example, moving towards the 
upper left quadrant is associated with higher meaning search and moving towards the lower 
right quadrant is associated with lower meaning search. 
 Epistemic motivations. As predicted, participants intuitively used criteria of epistemic 
motivations to differentiate discrete states. Sense-making proved the most explanatory of 
these features (see Table 1). The model displayed doubt, uncertainty, confusion, surprise, and 
disillusionment on the ‘positive’ half of the epistemic vectors with surprise detached from 
this cluster due to a high arousal score. Crucially, meaning search occupied a similar position 
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in this structure and dissected the upper right quadrant between dimension 1 and 2. States of 
sadness and disillusionment scored higher on meaning search compared to the other 
epistemic features, while surprise scored lower.  
 Arousal, valence and certainty. Core features of general affective states also proved 
explanatory in distinguishing states of more and less epistemic affect. As displayed in Figure 
1, arousal occupied a position close to the y-axis of the model. Affective states high on this 
axis were characterised as low in arousal. Similarly, valence occupied a position close to the 
x-axis and states higher on this axis were considered less negative. Together, arousal and 
valence had an almost orthogonal relationship indicating they are distinct features of the 
model, consistent with dimensional models of emotion (e.g., Russell, 1980). Certainty 
dissected the bottom left quadrant, indicating it is not orthogonally related to arousal or 
valence. Affective states scoring high in certainty included anger, regret, and frustration. 
 Study 2. Six features were retained from Study 1 due to the high explained variance 
and high reliability scores. Ratings again proved reliable for these 6 features (all α’s >.90). 
Regression analysis revealed that 5 of the 6 features explained over 50% of the variance in 
this structure. These were sense-making, understanding, search for meaning, certainty, and 
valence. Thus, we replicated findings from Study 1 regarding the relevance of epistemic 
motivations. As Table 1 illustrates, in this model, they accounted for more variance than even 
core features like arousal, valence and certainty. In particular, arousal explained considerably 
less variance than the other features (R2 =.12), and also less than in Study 1. The additional 
affective states made arousal much less of a distinguishing factor. As above, we fitted these 
feature vectors to the spatial structure (Figure 2). The orientations of these five vectors within 
this two-dimensional structure corresponded strongly with what we found in Study 1, further 
verifying the integrity of the spatial structure. 
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Epistemic motivations. Epistemic motivations populated the upper right quadrant of 
the model in a similar fashion to Study 1 and again distinguish doubt, uncertainty, confusion, 
surprise and disillusion as ‘epistemic’ states. This consistency provides further support for 
the presence of an epistemic vector within a dimensional model of negative affect.  However, 
an additional finding within this model suggests that fear can also be classified as an 
epistemic state. One may suggest that fear appears to be a statistical artefact in this regard but 
an examination of the feature ratings reveals that participants did indeed rate fear as above 
the midpoint on the epistemic features, and also above the average scores that other affective 
state received—fear seemed accurately portrayed on model’s epistemic features.  
Valence and certainty. In accordance with Study 1, certainty was orientated to the 
bottom left, distinguishing anger, regret, and frustration as highly certain states. Of the new 
states, both shame and guilt were also characterized in this way. Likewise, valence occupied 
a position close to the main vertical axis and as before, states higher on this dimension (e.g., 
surprise, confusion) are characterized as less negative. 
Study 3. The ratings of the Study 3 affective states on the six evaluative features 
retained from Study 1 proved reliable across participants (all α’s ≥ 0.92). Regression analysis 
revealed that three of the six features explained over 50% of the variance in this structure. 
These were search for meaning, sense-making, and understanding. The remaining three each 
explained comparatively little (for arousal, R2 =.45, for certainty, R2 = .42, & for valence, R2 
= .42). Standardised coefficients indicated that this search for meaning vector dissected the 
more epistemic quadrant of the model alongside sense-making and understanding. We found 
that fear again emerged among the epistemic states and scored highly on all three epistemic 
motivations. Loneliness and anxiety also emerged as highly related to these features along 
with the same five epistemic states from Studies 1 and 2 (confusion, doubt, disillusionment, 
surprise, and uncertainty).  
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Overall, these three studies attest to the reliability of our findings regarding the 
epistemic nature of negative affect. As these states were reliably differentiated according to 
their relation to epistemic motivations, emotions that have been labelled epistemic in prior 
research (e.g., Darwin, 1872/1965; Keltner & Shiota, 2003; Rozin & Cohen, 2003) can be 
separated from comparatively less epistemic states. Furthermore, we found that participants’ 
understanding of affective states were strongly characterized by differences in epistemic 
qualities such as meaning, understanding, and sense-making—thus linking affective states to 
epistemic and existential processes. Remarkably, these features differentiate the affective 
states on our model to an even greater extent than core affective features like valence and 
arousal. This finding emphasises the role of epistemic motivation in the interpretations and 
experiences of negative affect.  
In Studies 1-3, we rely on subjective perceptions of the similarity between states to 
derive relational models. However, there is some distinction to be made between current 
affective experiences and beliefs about such experiences (Robinson & Clore, 2002). We 
therefore sought to validate the MDS findings in a fourth Study by manipulating epistemic 
challenge and measuring participants’ actual experiences of affective states. 
Study 4: Validation by Experience 
In Study 4, we aimed to validate the MDS models by inducing experiences of 
negative affect via epistemic challenge (e.g. Pekrun et al., 2017). We tested the validity of the 
epistemic boundaries established in the spatial structures by investigating if this manipulation 
more strongly affects states classified as more (vs. less) epistemic. Furthermore, we 
investigated whether the reported similarity of emotional states is reflected in the actual 
experience of these states (Roseman & Smith, 2001; Russell & Bullock, 1985) by deriving a 
new dimensional model based on the correlations of state experiences rather than on 
participants judgments of these states’ similarity.  
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Method 
Participants. Given the explanatory power of epistemic motivations in our MDS 
models of negative affect we reasoned that a manipulation should have a medium to strong 
effect. A power analysis calculation, assuming this effect size (d = .6) in a between-subjects 
design, suggested that 90 participants were required to achieve approximately 80% power at 
an alpha of .05 (two-sided). Overall, 91 participants (53 women; Mage = 37.99, SD = 12.39; 
age range: 20 – 75 years) were recruited via Prolific Academic. Participants were 
compensated with £0.80 for their participation. An attention check required people to identify 
certain words from a sentence, provided by the researcher. All participants successfully 
passed this attention check. 
Procedure. Participants assigned to the experimental condition wrote about an 
experience or event when “things just do not make any sense, where you could not 
understand what was going on, or where you felt a need to search for meaning”. Those 
assigned to the control condition were instructed to write about “an event in your life that you 
perceive as ordinary, or mundane”, adopting a procedure similar to earlier research (e.g., Van 
Tilburg, Igou, & Sedikides, 2013; Van Tilburg, Sedikides, & Wildschut, 2015). After the 
writing task, participants reported how much they experienced each of the 3 epistemic 
motivations (i.e., sense-making, understanding, & meaning search) and the 18 affective states 
from studies 1-3. Experience of each state and motivation were rated on a scale of 1-7. 
Results and Discussion 
 By examining all three epistemic motivations (sense-making, understanding and 
meaning search) using a between-subjects MANOVA, we found that the manipulation was 
effective, F(3, 87) = 10.13, p < .001, η𝑝
2  = .26, Λ = .74. Univariate analysis showed that all 3 
motivations were significantly higher in the epistemic challenge condition compared to the 
control condition (see Table 2).  
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 Negative Affect. Using a between-subjects MANOVA on the experience of all 18 
states of negative, we found a significant effect of writing condition F(18, 72) = 6.93, p < 
.001, η𝑝
2  = .63, Λ = .37, with participants in the epistemic challenge condition reporting 
higher ratings for all 18 states of negative affect. Specifically, 15 of these 18 states differed 
significantly across conditions at an alpha level of .001. For the 3 remaining states (contempt, 
disgust & guilt), p-values ranged from .004 to .055. Overall, univariate effect sizes ranged 
from η𝑝
2  = .041 (disgust) to  η𝑝
2  = .54 (confusion). These latter two findings relate to an 
important prediction that stems from the Study 1-3 findings; negative states should 
systematically vary in their relation to epistemic motivations.  
The explanatory power of epistemic motivation in the MDS models suggest that 
differences in affective states are reflected in their epistemic qualities and the models 
delineate which states should be more or less associated with epistemic motivations. We 
tested the predictive validity of these delineations in two-ways. First, we divided states into 
two categories (epistemic vs. non-epistemic) based on the Study 3 model. Specifically, 
perpendicular lines from affective states to vectors on the model can be used to establish a 
rating for each state on each vector (see supplementary materials). Using this approach, states 
that achieved a positive rating for all three epistemic vectors were categorized as epistemic. 
Thus, nine states (anxiety, confusion, distress, doubt, disillusionment, fear, surprise and 
uncertainty) formed the epistemic group of affect and the nine remaining states (anger, 
contempt, disgust, disappointment, frustration, guilt, regret, sadness, & shame) formed the 
non-epistemic group of affect. Reliability coefficients of α = .93 and α = .91, respectively, 
confirmed the appropriateness of these groupings and scores were aggregated across the 
states within each category.  
We then conducted a mixed ANOVA with writing condition (control vs. epistemic 
motivation) as between-subjects factor and affect category (epistemic v non-epistemic) as a 
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within-subjects factor. As hypothesized, there was a significant main effect of writing 
condition, F(1,89) = 44.94, p < .001, η𝑝
2  = .34 and a significant category × condition 
interaction,  F(1,89) = 10.72, p = .002, η𝑝
2  = .12. In line our predictions, simple effects 
analysis revealed that while there was no significant difference across emotion categories in 
the control condition (p = .575), a significant difference emerged within the experimental 
conditions with participants experiencing higher levels of epistemic negative affect (M = 
4.29, SD = 1.20) compared to non-epistemic negative affect (M = 3.76, SD = 1.37), F(1,89) = 
15.79, p < .001, η𝑝
2  = .15. Thus, states in the MDS model most associated with epistemic 
motivation, were most effected by a manipulation of epistemic challenge. 
Importantly, we categorized states as epistemic versus non-epistemic in the above 
analysis to test how much participants experience more versus less epistemic states on 
average. However, the dimensional models do not define a ‘hard’ boundary between 
epistemic and non-epistemic states. Rather, states vary by degree. In addition, grouping states 
in a categorical manner tells us little about how each individual state is associated with 
epistemic motivation, and how well this corresponds with predictions derived from the MDS 
model. To address these issues, we computed correlation coefficients between each state and 
each epistemic motivation. We then tested how well these correlations correspond to the state 
‘ratings’ on each vector in Study 3 using rank order correlations. As Table 3 illustrates, the 
emotion vector ratings and correlation coefficients correspond closely, such that lower 
correlation coefficients align with more negative vector ratings and higher correlation 
coefficients align with more positive vector ratings. The overall consistency between vector 
ratings and participants experiences was confirmed for all three epistemic motivations with 
significant positive rank order correlations for sense making (ρ = .81, p <.001), understanding 
(ρ = .66, p = .003) and meaning search (ρ = .71, p = .001). Overall, these findings support the 
validity of the dimensional structures derived in Studies 1-3. 
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Modelling affective experiences. To further verify the structure of the spatial models 
derived in Studies 1-3 we calculated pair-wise correlations for each pair of emotions 
experienced by participants in this study and used these values as proxy similarity ratings 
(Shepard, 1980; Van Tilburg & Igou, 2016). In previous studies, we combined similarity 
matrices from each participant to derive a scaling solution. However, in the present study, we 
used the single 18 × 18 similarity matrix of the absolute correlations between the experiences 
of emotional states (Van Tilburg & Igou, 2017, Study 2 & 3). 
As in previous studies, a two-dimensional solution fit the data appropriately with a 
stress level below .15 (Stress = .03), indicating adequate fit (Kruskal & Wish, 1972). Figure 4 
illustrates the position of each state on the two-dimensional structure derived from 
correlations of emotional experiences. The positioning of the 18 states corresponds strongly 
with what we found in Studies 1-3 when spatial structures were derived based on participant 
similarity ratings. The highly similar location of states across Studies is confirmed by high 
correlations between dimensional coordinates across studies. The coordinates of the 10 states 
from Study 1 correlate strongly with coordinates on both dimensions here (r = .85, p = .002 
for dimension 1; r = .88, p = .001 for dimension 2). Likewise, for the 14 states in Study 2 (r = 
.88, p < .001 for dimension 1; r = .77, p = .001 for dimension 2) and the 18 states in Study 3 
(r = .77, p < .001 for dimension 1; r = .74, p = .001 for dimension 2). 
Overall, the results of Study 4 provide strong evidence for the validity of the spatial 
structures we derive in Studies 1-3. First, we found evidence to support key assumptions of 
our theoretical approach; namely that conceptualizations of the relation between emotional 
states is reflected in the experiences of these states. By experimentally manipulating 
epistemic challenge we verify predictions derived from the MDS models about which states 
should be more, or less, associated with different epistemic motivations. These experimental 
findings further elucidate the epistemic nature of negative affect. 
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General Discussion 
For some time, emotion researchers have theorized on the epistemic nature of 
affective states (Darwin, 1872/1965; Ellsworth, 2003; Keltner & Shiota, 2003; Rozin & 
Cohen, 2003; Tomkins, 1962). With the current research, we shed further light on this topic. 
We explored the epistemic features of negative affect and thereby link these affective states 
to epistemic motivations. Specifically, we investigated weather epistemic motivations 
differentiate negative states of affect by assessing both conceptualisations and experiences. 
Affective states most characterized by epistemic pursuits serve epistemic functions and can 
be considered more epistemic in nature. 
Across four studies we gained insights into the nature of negative affect and examined 
how negative states related to epistemic processes. In Studies 1-3, we assessed similarities 
and differences among states of negative affect and established three separate spatial 
structures that model their interrelations. We modelled an increasing number of affective 
states and each time obtained a similar two-dimensional structure with highly consistent 
locations for the affective states assessed. In Study 1, epistemic motivations differentiated 
more epistemic states (e.g., doubt) from less epistemic states (e.g., anger), while core 
affective features helped reveal how epistemic states differ from one another. Studies 2 and 3 
extended these findings across a broader range of negative states, establishing the reliability 
of the dimensional model obtained. The explanatory power of epistemic motivations 
remained consistent throughout all three studies and compared favourably with core features 
like affect and arousal. Finally, Study 4 evidenced the validity of these findings in an 
experimental test. The relations between experiences of affective states and epistemic 
motivations corresponded to the relations established in the MDS models. Our findings have 
significant implications for the study of many different affective states and epistemic 
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processes. We will consider the implications of these findings for affective states and 
epistemic process independently. 
States of Epistemic Affect 
Confusion. Across all three studies, confusion was found to be associated with 
epistemology. This is consistent with past research, which has classified confusion as a 
‘knowledge emotion’ (Silvia, 2010) that is highly prevalent during learning activities 
(D’Mello, 2013). Our analysis rates confusion as less negative, but higher in arousal (Study 1 
and Study 3) than epistemic states such as doubt, uncertainty, and disillusionment. It is also 
related to meaning search.  
Doubt and uncertainty. Doubt and uncertainty share many characteristics, but our 
findings suggests that they can be distinguished from one another. Specifically, doubt and 
uncertainty vary most in arousal and valence with doubt considered more negative and less 
arousing. These states overlap their relation to epistemic motivations, including meaning 
search. This interrelation is supported by past literature demonstrating that both states are 
associated with compensatory responses linked to meaning-regulation (e.g., Van den Bos, 
2009). Future research should expand on the phenomenological distinctions between these 
two related states and explore what divergent behaviours they may predict. 
Disillusionment. Janoff-Bulman and Berg (1998) suggested that disillusionment is an 
antecedent to meaning making efforts that trigger post-traumatic growth. Past research 
suggests that disillusionment predicts marriage breakdown (Huston et al., 2001) and is 
associated with political radicalisation (Maher, Igou, & Van Tilburg, 2018). Investigating the 
unique affective components of this experience helps to better understand the processes that 
lead to these outcomes. Our research indicates how disillusionment may differ from sadness 
and disappointment. Specifically, disillusionment may be higher in arousal than sadness but 
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lower in arousal than disappointment. Also, replicating previous findings, this research 
suggests that disillusionment is related to meaning search (Maher et al., 2018).  
Surprise. Within the relational structures we derived, surprise was high in arousal 
(Study1), and moderately related to epistemology (Studies 1-3). Among the epistemic 
negative states, surprise emerges as the least negative, though not entirely detached from the 
other feelings. This finding is consistent with prior findings that classify surprise as either 
mildly positive (e.g., Fontaine et al., 2007) or mildly negative (e.g., Noordewier & 
Breugelmans, 2013). Unlike many of the other epistemic states tested, surprise has not been 
related to meaning regulation process in the past.  
Anxiety and fear. In recent years, literature has increasingly highlighted the 
palliative features of epistemic processes (e.g., Greenberg et al., 1990; Jost, Glaser, 
Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003; Proulx, Inzlicht, & Harmon-Jones, 2012). Our research 
further supports such theories by demonstrating that people relate experiences like fear and 
anxiety to epistemic pursuits. Indeed, knowledge that violates expectations can trigger 
anxiety, even when it is a source of good news (i.e., learning that your test scores have 
improved; Plaks & Stecher, 2007). Accordingly, by clinging to epistemic frameworks 
(Greenberg et al., 1990; Jost et al., 2003) or bolstering a sense of meaning (Proulx & Inzlicht, 
2012) people attempt to reduce feelings of fear and anxiety (Proulx, et al., 2012).  
 Loneliness. Belongingness and social connection are core components of 
meaningfulness (Proulx & Heine, 2006).  Consistently, loneliness has been regarded as a 
form of existential distress (Fromm, 1947) associated with the search for meaning (Van 
Tilburg, Igou, & Maher 2018).  Our findings further evidence the existential character of 
loneliness and additionally relate it to sense making and understandings. Indeed, group 
membership and social identities serve epistemic functions (Kruglanski, 1989) and 
understanding is one of 4 core social motivations (Fiske, 2004). Consistently, in Study 4 we 
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found that experiences of loneliness were correlated with a desire to understand more. Taken 
together, our results, and previous findings, suggest that loneliness may classified as an 
epistemic emotion.  
Evaluative Features 
Across three studies, we established vectors that characterized different two-
dimensional representations of negative affective states. In Study 1 we found high explained 
variance for features of arousal, certainty, meaning search, sense-making and understanding. 
In Study 2, we replicated what we found with respect to the epistemic motivations and 
valence. However, within this Study 2 model, both certainty and arousal offered little 
explanatory value. In Study 3, we further substantiated the explanatory value of epistemic 
pursuits to differentiate states of negative affect. Even with 18 different states under 
assessment, each epistemic characteristic accounted for over 50% of variance within the 
model. Finally, in Study 4 we manipulated epistemic challenge and demonstrated that 
experiences of epistemic motivations and affective states correspond in the way the MDS 
models predict. Overall, these results highlight the prominence of epistemic features among 
negative states of affect.   
Broadly speaking, our findings support the assumptions of the meaning maintenance 
model. This model explains that epistemic challenges function as meaning threats and trigger 
compensatory responses that serve to reaffirm meaning (Proulx & Heine, 2006). Consistently, 
we found that relation to meaning search proved a distinguishing factor among an eclectic 
group of negative affective states and corresponded strongly with other epistemic pursuits. 
Previously, the affective components of meaning maintenance have proved difficult to 
conceptualise (Proulx & Inzlicht, 2012). However, there is already evidence to suggest that 
fear (Lambert et al., 2013), and uncertainty (Van den Bos, 2009) are influential in this regard, 
and our research suggests that doubt, disillusion, and confusion may play similar roles.  
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  Different states of affect may motivate distinct forms of meaning regulation. Such a 
prediction would be consistent with a feeling is for doing approach to affect (Zeelenberg & 
Pieters, 2006), which proposes that each emotional state serves distinct motivational 
functions. As such, and as we have found here, specific functions should prove effective 
criteria for differentiating affective states. Strategies of meaning-regulation vary highly (see 
Jonas et al., 2013) and it is possible that different affective states predict divergent meaning-
regulation behaviour. For example, disgust sensitivity has been shown to moderate defensive 
responses to mortality salience (Kelley et al., 2015). Consistently, our research suggests 
disgust is inversely related to meaning search, a non-defensive strategy. Moreover, while the 
constructs of understanding and sense-making overlapped strongly in these dimensional 
models, meaning search proved at least partially distinct. The search for meaning could be 
considered a broader, more abstract epistemic process. Indeed, there is research to suggest 
that negative states of affective are distinguishable based upon whether they broaden or 
narrow cognitive processing (Gable & Harmon-Jones, 2010). 
 Affective sates can be distinguished according to their motivational intensity (Gable 
& Harmon-Jones, 2010). States high in approach motivation narrow attentional focus; states 
low in motivational intensity broaden it. Meaning search is an abstract concept that has been 
associated with high levels of construal (Kelly, Davis, Kim, Tang, & Hicks, 2016) and the 
search for meaning may be more closely related to affective states that broaden cognitive 
focus. Our findings are consistent with this account, in relation to states of disgust and anger 
(high motivational intensity – low relation to meaning search), as well as sadness and 
loneliness (low motivational intensity – high relation to meaning search), but perhaps less so 
with regard to fear (high motivational intensity – high relation to meaning search). However, 
there is already evidence to suggest that, unlike other high intensity emotions, fear and 
anxiety can be objectless states (Ohman, 2000). Since emotional clarity is related to higher 
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presence of meaning, it stands to reason that an objectless state may increase search for 
meaning and broaden the focus of attentional processes. Future research may wish to explore 
these features of fear and anxiety experiences, and how they influence cognitive processing, 
in greater depth.  
Limits on Generality  
We see our approach as complementary to existing models of affect. Specifically, we 
do not assess (nor set out to assess) the underlying dimensions of affect in general, and do not 
suggest that epistemic motivations in some way ‘replace’ core dimensions of general affect 
discovered by researchers including Russell (1980), Smith and Ellsworth (1985) and Fontaine 
et al. (2007). Instead, we show that people strongly differentiate between affective states 
based on their epistemic qualities, as they do in terms of valence and arousal. This is 
important because it suggests that the causes or consequences of these emotions may in part 
be understood from an epistemic perspective. For example, the negatively valanced state of 
doubt may promote behaviours that are pleasurable (hence reducing negative affect), and the 
finding that this state is also characterized by a meaning search may suggest that such 
pleasure will follow from a meaning-restoring activity. Thus, core dimensions of emotion 
models (affect, arousal) and our epistemic motives are likely complementary and interactive. 
Our research was not designed to represent the definitive list of states of epistemic 
affect. We focused on the painful, negative experiences that are associated with lack of or 
inadequate explanations and expectations that people have about the world. Thus, an 
examination of positive affect would be beyond the scope of the current research; however, 
research on states such as interest and curiosity (Kashdan & Silvia, 2009) hint at epistemic 
processes associated with positive valence. Of course, the addition of positive states to the 
model would likely increase the explanatory power of a feature such as valence. However, 
when examining negative affect in isolation, other features become important, and our results 
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suggest that epistemic motivations are an important feature of negative affect. Although we 
focus on negative affect, we are confident that our research will contribute to future models 
examining evaluative dimensions for both negative and positive states.  
Conclusion 
A desire to understand the world around us is a core human need (e.g., Heine et al., 
2006). As much as any other core human need, it is an emotive pursuit and affective states 
likely have a role to play when our epistemic coherence is challenged. Here, we aimed to 
establish a profile of the negative affective states involved in this process—epistemic states 
versus non-epistemic negative affective states. The unanimity and boundaries of any such 
category of affect had not previously been empirically demonstrated and past research often 
failed to link negative states to epistemic process. Our results demonstrate that epistemic 
motivations are a central part of people’s representations of negative affect that help explain 
how negative feelings are differentiated. These findings highlight the importance of 
epistemology in people’s everyday lives. People strive for meaning and understanding in 
everyday life and this is reflected in the fact that affective systems help guide people in their 
understanding of the world. Overall, our work makes an important contribution by shedding 
light on an underexplored realm of negative affect. We propose that future research 
incorporate these findings within and beyond models of epistemic threat.  
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Table 1: Explained variance figures for each characteristic across all three Studies 
 
Arousal Certainty Meaning 
Search 
Sense 
Making 
Understanding Valence 
Study 1 0.83 0.89 0.69 0.85 0.68 0.68 
Study 2 0.12 0.61 0.72 0.77 0.77 0.52 
Study 3 0.45 0.42 0.63 0.59 0.59 0.42 
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Table 2: Mean (SD) ratings for epistemic motivation across writing conditions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sense Making Understanding Meaning Search 
Epistemic 
challenge 
5.28 (1.20) 3.14 (1.84) 3.35 (1.92) 
 
4.93 ( .52) 3.14 (1.84) 3.35 (1.92) 
 
4.70 (1.64) 
Control     3.73 (1.94) 3.04 (1.88) 3.06 (1.84) 
p 0.00 0.00 0.00 
η𝑝
2  .19 .23 .18 
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Table 3: Vector ratings (Study 3) and correlation coefficients (Study 4) between each 
affective state and epistemic motivation 
 
Sense Making Understanding Meaning Search 
 Vector r Vector r Vector r 
Anger -0.75 .188 -0.79 .296 -0.91 .186 
Anxiety 0.42 .252 0.44 .395 0.50 .283 
Confusion 0.85 .354 0.80 .513 0.57 .384 
Contempt -0.41 .064 -0.50 .060 -0.86 .026 
Disappointment -0.61 .147 -0.61 .293 -0.55 .158 
Disgust -0.86 .121 -0.93 .190 -1.15 .073 
Disillusionment 0.05 .143 0.09 .364 0.25 .192 
Distress 0.21 .204 0.17 .355 0.01 .225 
Doubt 0.76 .210 0.82 .352 0.99 .317 
Fear 1.03 .223 1.02 .356 0.92 .270 
Frustration 0.03 .221 -0.04 .391 -0.31 .182 
Guilt -1.00 .013 -0.93 .121 -0.61 .111 
Loneliness 0.28 .071 0.38 .205 0.74 .125 
Regret -0.69 .114 -0.64 .260 -0.41 .182 
Sadness -0.28 .177 -0.19 .314 0.15 .208 
Shame -1.19 .037 -1.18 .204 -1.05 .120 
Surprise 1.06 .279 0.98 .274 0.61 .144 
Uncertainty 0.98 .290 1.02 .420 1.10 .389 
Note: In Study 3, the scale on each vector is from -1.5 to 1.5 
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Figure 1. Two-dimensional representation of affective states in Study 1 with evaluative 
features as vectors. 
Note: MS = meaning search; US = relation to understanding; SM = relation to sense-making; 
VA = valence; AR = arousal; CT = certainty. 
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Figure 2. Two-dimensional representation of affective states in Study 2 with evaluative 
features as vectors. 
Note: MS = meaning search; US = relation to understanding; SM = relation to sense-making; 
VA = valence; CT = certainty. 
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Figure 3. Two-dimensional representation of affective states in Study 3 with evaluative 
features as vectors. 
Note: MS = meaning search; US = relation to understanding; SM = relation to sense-making; 
VA = valence; AR = arousal; CT = certainty. 
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Figure 4. Two-dimensional representations of the similarity of affective states based on 
participants’ experiences in Study 4 
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